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Abstract	
	
This	article	introduces	the	idea	of	philosophical	sociology	as	an	enquiry	into	the	relationships	
between	implicit	notions	of	human	nature	and	explicit	conceptualizations	of	social	life	within	
sociology.	Philosophical	sociology	is	also	an	invitation	to	reflect	on	the	role	of	the	normative	
in	 social	 life	 by	 looking	 at	 it	 sociologically	 and	 philosophically	 at	 the	 same:	normative	 self‐
reflection	 is	 a	 fundamental	 aspect	 of	 sociology’s	 scientific	 tasks	 because	 key	 sociological	
questions	are,	 in	 the	 last	 instance,	also	philosophical	ones.	For	the	normative	to	emerge,	we	
need	to	move	away	from	the	reductionism	of	hedonistic,	essentialist	or	cynical	conceptions	of	
human	 nature.	 Sociology	 needs	 equally	 to	 grasp	 the	 conceptions	 of	 the	 good	 life,	 justice,	
democracy	 or	 freedom	 whose	 normative	 contents	 depend	 on	 more	 or	 less	 articulated	
conceptions	 of	 our	 shared	 humanity	 rather	 than	 on	 strategic	 considerations.	 The	 idea	 of	
philosophical	sociology	is	then	sustained	on	three	main	pillars	and	I	use	them	to	structure	this	
article:	 (1)	 a	 revalorization	 of	 the	 relationships	 between	 sociology	 and	 philosophy;	 (2)	 a	
universalistic	 principle	 of	 humanity	 that	 works	 as	 a	 major	 regulative	 idea	 of	 sociological	
research,	 and;	 (3)	 an	 argument	 on	 the	 social	 (immanent)	 and	 pre‐social	 (transcendental)	
sources	 of	 the	 normative	 in	 social	 life.	 As	 invitations	 to	 embrace	 posthuman	 cyborgs,	 non‐
human	actants	and	material	cultures	proliferate,	philosophical	sociology	offers	the	reminder	
that	we	still	have	to	understand	more	fully	who	are	the	human	beings	that	populate	the	social	
world.	
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The	 crisis	 of	 trust	 in	 several	 of	 our	 major	 social	 institutions	 over	 the	 past	 few	 years	 put	
puzzling	questions	to	sociology.	The	press,	the	police,	parliament,	the	Catholic	church,	banks	
and	rating	agencies	are	all	functionally	specific	and,	because	of	that,	they	are	entrusted	with	
the	protection	and	indeed	promotion	of	values	that	are	central	to	their	societal	contribution:	
independent	 and	 trustworthy	 information,	 civil	 protection,	 representation	 and	 decision‐
making,	moral	guidance,	safeguarding	our	private	assets.	 In	most	cases,	 the	procedures	that	
should	have	prevented	institutional	misbehaviours	were	in	place	and	were	well	known	by	the	
individuals	 concerned.	 Citizens	 and	 social	 scientists	 are	 equally	 concerned	 with	 why	 the	
values	 that	 society	 reasonably	expected	were	being	protected	were	 rather	being	knowingly	
eroded	by	the	guardians	themselves.		
	
Rather	 troublingly	 for	 us	 in	 sociology,	 however,	 these	 are	 not	 instances	 of	 anomie,	
dedifferentiation	 or	 iron	 cages.	 As	 I	 see	 it,	 our	 challenge	 is	 twofold.	 First,	 one	 underlying	
common	theme	to	all	 these	crises	refers	to	the	problematic	location	of	the	normative	in	social	
life.	 They	 demonstrate	 that,	 despite	 its	 fragility,	 the	 normative	 is	 not	 mere	 idealistic	 talk	
because	 the	 functional	 performance	 of	 these	 institutions	was	undermined	by	 the	neglect	 of	
their	normative	duties	to	the	rest	of	society.	The	normative	is	not	the	central	sphere	of	social	
life	 –	 it	 arguably	 never	 was	 –	 but	 nor	 is	 it	 possible	 to	 conceptualize	 the	 social	 without	 it.	
Sociology	 is	 surely	 not	 responsible	 for	 what	 happened	 even	 if	 its	 moralism	 and	 uncritical	
advocacy	 is	 highly	 frustrating	 at	 times.	 Yet	we	 still	 need	 to	 explore	whether	 sociology	may	
have	 unwittingly	 contributed	 to	 it	with	 a	 depiction	 of	 the	 social	world	 in	which	 normative	
ideas	 play	 no	 role;	 a	 representation	 of	 the	 social	 that	 has	 been	 emptied	 of	 all	 normative	
orientations:	 the	 atrophy	 and	 hypertrophy	 of	 the	 normative	 are	 equally	 dangerous.	 	 The	
second	question	also	refers	to	the	philosophical	infrastructure	of	sociological	thinking;	in	this	
case,	how	can	our	explanations	connect	institutional	failings	with	the	actions	and	practices	of	
individual	media	editors,	members	of	parliament,	police	officers,	priests	and	traders	for	whom	
temptations	were	just	too	great	to	resist.	To	an	extent,	this	is	surely	related	to	the	perennial	
debate	between	structure	and	agency	in	sociology.	But	our	ability	to	explain	the	relationships	
between	 individual	actions	and	 institutional	 failings	still	needs	 to	be	 traced	back	 to	 implicit	
conceptions	 of	 human	 nature	 that	 remain	 in	 place	 inside	 sociological	 accounts.	 These	 two	
questions,	 values	 and	 human	 nature	 or,	 as	 I	 rather	 discuss	 them	 below,	 the	 sources	 of	 the	
normative	in	social	 life	and	a	principle	of	humanity,	are	central	to	this	article	and	its	idea	of	
philosophical	sociology.		
	
The	status	of	our	shared	humanity	has	of	course	been	a	major	topic	of	debate	in	the	Western	
tradition	of	social	and	political	thought.	If	we	look	only	at	the	twentieth	century,	World	War	II	
marks	a	conventional	turning	point:	on	the	one	hand,	the	claim	that	only	hypocrisy	is	involved	
in	 invoking	 humanity	 as	 a	 higher	moral	 notion,	 as	 apparent	 in	 Carl	 Schmitt	 (2007),	Martin	
Heidegger	(1977)	and,	all	political	differences	notwithstanding,	also	in	Jean‐Francois	Lyotard	
(1993);	on	 the	other	hand,	Karl	 Jaspers	(2001)	and	Hannah	Arendt’s	 (1998)	admission	that	
appeals	 to	 humanity	 failed	 miserably	 to	 prevent	 war	 crimes	 but	 that	 they	 none	 the	 less	
remain	 a	 fundamental	 resource	 of	 our	 normative	 imaginary.	 More	 recent	 debates	 inside	
sociology	also	show	an	interest	in	the	status	of	the	idea	of	humanity,	with	its	focus	now	being	
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on	 how	 (bio)technologies	 are	 transforming	 the	 makeup	 of	 our	 species	 in	 both	 theory	 and	
practice	(Fuller	2011;	Latour	1993;	Rose	2013);	indeed,	similar	questions	have	been	equally	
raised	 in	 methodologically	 driven	 debates	 (Adkins	 and	 Lury	 2009;	 Back	 2012;	 Back	 and	
Puwar	2012).	 I	 share	 their	 concern	 that	we	need	more	and	better	 sociology	and	 their	view	
that	 this	requires	an	explicit	unpacking	of	 the	wider	ontological	and	political	 implications	of	
actual	social	scientific	work.	More	problematic,	it	seems	to	me,	is	their	premature	embracing	
of	post‐social	and	indeed	post‐human	standpoints.	I	should	rather	suggest	that	we	are	not	in	a	
position	to	make	such	claims	not	least	because	we	still	do	not	fully	understand	the	role	that	
ideas	 of	 humanity	 and	 human	 nature	 have	 actually	 played	 within	 sociology.	 In	 turn,	 this	
exploration	may	help	us	account	for	sociology’s	difficulties	in	understanding	the	normative.		
	
The	 idea	 of	 philosophical	 sociology	 seeks	 to	 elucidate	 the	 relationships	 between	 implicit	
notions	 of	 human	 nature	 and	 explicit	 conceptualizations	 of	 social	 life	within	 sociology	 and	
argues	that	a	normative	vocation	for	sociology	emerges	out	of	implicit	presuppositions	about	
the	shared	humanity	of	human	beings	to	be	found	inside	sociological	theorizing.	Philosophical	
sociology	reflects	on	the	 intractable	centrality	of	 the	normative	 in	social	 life	by	 looking	at	 it	
sociologically	 and	philosophically	 at	 the	 same:	 the	questions	 that	matter	 to	 sociologists	 are	
always,	in	the	last	instance,	also	philosophical	ones.	Let	me	briefly	introduce	the	main	tenets	
of	 the	 idea	 of	 philosophical	 sociology	 through	 three	 interrelated	 propositions.	 These	 then	
organize	the	bulk	of	my	exposition	below.		
	
1.	 The	 relationships	 between	 sociology	 and	 philosophy.	 The	 idea	 of	 philosophical	
sociology	 builds	 upon	 a	 series	 of	 interventions	 over	 the	 past	 one	 hundred	 years.	 It	
takes	 the	 history	 of	 ideas	 seriously	 and	 argues	 that	 attempts	 at	 historical	 self‐
clarification	 are	 essential	 (Gouldner	 1965;	 McCarthy	 2003).	 Yet	 this	 is	 not	 only	 an	
exercise	in	historical	precedence	because,	in	order	to	be	truly	sociological,	they	require	
substantiation	vis‐à‐vis	 contemporary	 concerns.	An	additional	 consequence	of	 this	 is	
that	claims	to	novelty	are	neither	actively	sought	nor	automatically	accepted	as	criteria	
of	 explanatory	 success;	 the	 current	 obsession	 with	 novelty,	 innovation	 or	 radical	
epochal	changes	may	have	undermined	our	actual	ability	to	understand	contemporary	
social	transformations	(Chernilo	2007a).		
	
2.	 The	 principle	 of	 humanity.	 As	 it	 concentrates	 on	 explaining	 social	 life	 as	 an	
autonomous	 and	 emergent	 domain,	 ideas	 of	 human	 nature	 have	 remained	 largely	
underexplored	within	 sociology.	 Human	 nature	 is	 treated	 as	 a	metaphysical	 residue	
that	ought	to	be	definitively	transcended	and	yet	presuppositions	about	human	nature	
remain	 widely	 present	 in	 contemporary	 sociology	 as	 it	 is	 actually	 practised	 (Leahy	
2012).	 Not	 all	 conceptions	 of	 human	 nature	 are	 equally	 fit	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	
sociological	work,	however,	so	my	claim	is	that	sociology’s	principle	of	humanity	must	
be	wholeheartedly	universalistic	in	orientation.	Below	I	will	then	contrast	substantive	
and	teleological	 ideas	of	human	nature,	which	tend	to	be	reductionist,	against	a	more	
abstract	 counterfactual	 principle	of	humanity	 that	 works	 as	 a	 key	 regulative	 idea	 in	
sociology.	
 4
	
3.	 The	 dual	 social	 and	 pre‐social	 sources	 of	 the	 normative	 in	 social	 life.	 Sociology’s	
perennial	 normative	 concerns	 are	 a	 direct	 result	 of	 its	 principle	 of	 humanity;	 we	
constantly	 go	 back	 to	 the	 consequences	 of	 human	 action	 on	 human	 beings,	 to	 the	
impact	 of	 social	 institutions	 on	 future	 developments	 of	 human	 life.	 In	 order	 to	
understand	the	normative,	we	need	to	treat	it	sociologically	and	philosophically	at	the	
same	time:	the	normative	is	human‐made	and	socio‐historically	changeable,	thence	its	
fully	immanent	quality,	but	it	is	also	pre‐social,	and	thus	quasi‐transcendental,	because	
a	principle	of	humanity	that	remains	largely	untouched	by	social	forces	is	a	condition	
of	possibility	of	conceptualizing	social	life.		
	
I.		
The	idea	of	philosophical	sociology	that	this	paper	delineates	seeks	to	delimit	 further	a	rich	
history	of	 interconnections	between	sociology	and	philosophy	over	the	past	century.	It	does	
so	from	the	point	of	view	of	sociology,	and	we	can	distinguish	three	strategies	to	look	at	their	
interrelationships.	 A	 first	 positivist	 path	 understands	 the	 philosophical	 tradition	 as	
sociology’s	pre‐scientific	heritage,	whereas	its	future	belongs	to	empirical	and	scientific	work.	
Within	the	classical	cannon	this	attitude	is	arguably	best	represented	by	Durkheim	who,	to	be	
sure,	 engaged	 extensively	 in	 philosophical	 speculation	 and	 argued	 that	 a	 strict	 separation	
between	sociology	and	philosophy	was	itself	a	philosophical	proposition	that	was	ultimately	
impossible	 (Durkheim	1960,	 1982).	 But	 the	 key	 feature	 of	 this	 standpoint	 is	 that,	 however	
important,	the	engagement	with	philosophical	sources	 is	not	a	sociological	 task	sensu	stricto	
(Luhmann	 1994;	 Merton	 1964).	 A	 second	 strand	 is	 constituted	 by	 explicit	 attempts	 at	
epistemological	 self‐clarification.	 An	 argument	 that	 we	 can	 trace	 back	 to	 Weber’s	
methodological	 debates,	 the	 focus	 here	 is	 on	 elucidating	 the	 logic	 sociology’s	 scientific	
arguments	 (Weber	 1949).	 All	 such	 debates	 as	 idealism	 v	 materialism,	 individualism	 v	
collectivism,	or	realism	v	constructivism,	belong	in	this	category,	and	we	may	equally	include	
here	 sociological	meta‐theory	and	more	historicist	 accounts	of	 the	history	of	 sociology	 that	
are	 written	 in	 order	 to	 illuminate	 its	 wider	 cognitive	 commitments	 (Benton	 1977;	 Levine	
1995;	 Ritzer	 1988).	 The	 third	 approach	 is	 closer	 to	 social	 philosophy	 and	 uses	 the	
philosophical	tradition	to	clarify	sociology’s	normative	motifs	(Ginsberg	1968;	Hughes	1974).	
Marx’s	(1975)	influence	over	the	future	development	of	sociology	is	arguably	paradigmatic	of	
this	 kind	 of	 engagement,	 as	 apparent	 in	 how	 twentieth‐century	 critical	 theory	 views	 the	
reconfiguration	 of	 normative	 questions	 as	 philosophy’s	 key	 contribution	 to	 scientific	
sociology	(Adorno	2000;	Habermas	1974;	Marcuse	1973),	but	it	is	also	available	to	‘nostalgic’	
or	 conservative	positions	 (Nisbet	 1967;	 MacIntyre	 2007).	 These	 three	 approaches	 on	 the	
relationships	between	philosophy	and	sociology	may	not	exhaust	all	options	but	capture	the	
most	 salient	 sociological	 attitudes.	 Philosophical	 sociology	 takes	 something	 from	 all	 three	
positions:	 it	 contributes	 to	 sociology’s	 scientific	project	by	keeping	normative	and	empirical	
claims	 separate	 while	 in	 constant	 interplay	 (versions	 1	 and	 2)	 and	 also	 to	 sociology’s	
philosophical	 infrastructure	 because	 sociological	 enquiry	 is	 always	 susceptible	 of	 further	
normative	scrutiny	(version	3).		
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My	use	of	philosophical	sociology	here	has	little	to	do	with	the	application	of	network	analysis	
to	intellectual	history,	as	in	Randall	Collins’s	Sociology	of	Philosophies	(Collins	1998).	Rather,	it	
is	 inspired	 in	 the	 more	 general	 idea	 of	 philosophical	 anthropology,	 which	 can	 be	
conventionally	defined	as	a	systematic	inquiry	‘general	concepts’	of	humanity	and	our	human	
properties	 (Hacker	 2010).2 Philosophical	 sociology	 is	 however	 different	 from	 philosophical	
anthropology	in	that	it	seeks	to	unpack	the	relationships	between	mostly	implicit	conceptions	
of	human	nature	and	sociological	conceptions	of	the	social	in	order	to	reflect	on	the	problem	
of	 the	normative	 in	 social	 life.	 It	 is	a	philosophically	informed	form	of	sociology	rather	 than	a	
strictly	 normative	 approach	 or	 a	 reflection	 on	 the	 social	 conditionings	 of	 philosophical	
enquiry.3	
	
The	 idea	of	philosophical	sociology	achieved	some	modest	notoriety	 in	German	sociology	at	
the	turn	of	the	twentieth	century.	In	the	context	of	a	discipline	that	was	still	intellectually	and	
institutionally	 in	 the	 making,	 philosophical	 sociology	 was	 never	 intended	 to	 replace	
empirically	minded	social	 research.	Rather,	 it	was	meant	 to	 clarify	 the	presuppositions	 that	
were	constitutive	of,	yet	not	directly	central	to,	the	scientific	establishment	of	sociology.	In	his	
lecture	at	the	first	German	sociology	conference	in	1910,	Ferdinand	Tönnies	defined	it	as	an	
enquiry	into	the	logical	organization	of	sociological	concepts	both	inside	sociology	and	in	its	
relationships	 with	 other	 fields.	 Given	 its	 historical	 roots	 in	 philosophy,	 moreover,	 modern	
sociology	was	 seen	 as	 a	 response	 to	 normative	 concerns	 in	 contemporary	 society	 and	 thus	
should	remain	fundamentally	connected	to	questions	about	the	 ‘ethical	and	good	conduct	of	
life’	 (Tönnies	2005:	57).	He	then	argues	that	sociology	must	hold	on	to	the	 invitation	of	 the	
Oracle	of	Delphi	–	know	thyself:	sociology	should	become	‘the	impartial	attempt	to	do	justice	
to	this	commandment’	(Tönnies	2005:	72).	This	early	reference	to	philosophical	sociology	in	
Tönnies	 is	 thus	 partly	 epistemological	 and	 partly	 normative:	 it	 asks	 how	 sociological	
knowledge	is	being	construed	while	it	simultaneously	makes	the	reflexive	motto	of	knowing	
oneself	essential	for	sociology’s	normative	contribution	to	society.4	
	
Georg	 Simmel	 also	 took	 up	 the	 idea	 of	 philosophical	 sociology	 as	 part	 of	 his	 well‐known	
Kantian	 interrogation	 into	 the	 ‘transcendental’	 presuppositions	 that	 make	 society	 possible	
(Simmel	1909).	But	Simmel	equally	suggested	that	there	is	a	second	metaphysical	dimension	
to	philosophical	sociology:	in	order	to	move	forward	as	a	science,	sociology	must	be	prepared	
to	 overcome	 the	 restrictions	 that	 emerge	 from	 the	 slow	 pace	 at	 which	 all	 scientific	
contributions	 actually	 evolve.	 For	 sociology	 to	 become	 truly	 meaningful	 in	 wider	 public	
debates,	it	needs	to	move	faster	and	more	radically	than	science.	It	is	only	thanks	to	this	work	
of	genuine	philosophical	anticipation,	 argues	Simmel,	that	we	endow	social	phenomena	with	
cultural	 significance.	The	most	pressing	sociological	questions	are	precisely	 those	 for	which	
exclusively	scientific	answers	are	evidently	insufficient:		
	
Is	society	the	purpose	of	human	existence,	or	is	it	a	means	for	the	individual?	Does	the	
ultimate	 value	 of	 social	 development	 lie	 in	 the	 unfolding	 of	 personality	 or	 of	
association?	Do	meaning	and	purpose	inhere	in	social	phenomena	at	all,	or	exclusively	
in	individuals?	(Simmel	1950:	25)5	
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Simmel	 and	 Tönnies	 thus	 share	 epistemological	 and	 normative	 motifs	 for	 the	 project	 of	
philosophical	sociology	but	they	sought	neither	undermine	scientific	sociology	nor	turn	it	into	
sociology’s	philosophical	sublation.	
	
Arguably	 the	 most	 consequential	 intervention	 in	 this	 early	 delimitation	 of	 philosophical	
sociology	 comes	 from	 Karl	 Löwith’s	Max	Weber	and	Karl	Marx.	 First	 published	 in	 1932,	 it	
contends	 that	 both	 writers	 successfully	 brought	 together	 the	 two	 intellectual	 genres	 of	
(venerable)	philosophy	and	(novel)	social	science.	In	empirical	terms,	Weber	and	Marx	were	
equally	interested	in	capitalism	and	offered	radically	different	interpretations	of	its	emergence	
and	functioning.	But	there	is	another	layer	to	their	writings	that	for	Löwith	is	more	significant	
and	where	striking	 commonalities	become	apparent:	 the	 core	 ‘of	 their	 investigations	 is	one	
and	the	same	(…)	what	 is	 it	 that	makes	man	“human”	within	 the	capitalistic	world’	 (Löwith	
1993:	42–3).	This	anthropological	enquiry	was	surely	not	the	explicit	goal	of	either	writer	but	
therein	 lies	none	the	 less	 ‘their	original	motive’	 (Löwith	1993:	43).	Weber	and	Marx	offer	a	
new	kind	of	intellectual	enquiry	that	is,	simultaneously,	empirically	informed	and	normatively	
oriented,	and	this	is	precisely	what	makes	them	‘philosophical	sociologists’	(Löwith	1993:	48).	
It	 is	through	the	combination	of	scientific	and	philosophical	approaches	that	they	addressed	
fundamental	 intellectual	questions:	 the	 interplay	of	material	and	ideal	 factors	 in	human	 life,	
the	 immanent	 and	 transcendental	 condition	 of	 historical	 time,	 the	 relationships	 between	
social	 action	 and	 human	 fate,	 the	 disjuncture	 between	 existential	 concerns	we	 all	 share	 as	
human	beings	 and	our	particular	 socio‐historical	 contexts.	 Philosophical	 sociology	becomes	
then	 a	 programme	 in	 which	 sociology’s	 most	 fundamental	 scientific	 challenge,	 the	
understanding	of	modern	capitalism,	is	only	possible	on	the	basis	of	a	philosophical	quest	for	a	
principle	of	humanity	that	is	fundamentally	normative.		
	
II.		
Löwith’s	 interest	 in	 this	 connection	 between	 general	 theories	 of	 modern	 society	 and	
philosophical	 ideas	 of	 humanity	 and	 human	 nature	 within	 sociology	 is	 largely	 though	 not	
wholly	 exceptional.6 Indeed,	 one	 of	 sociology’s	 early	 motifs	 was	 the	 critique	 of	 previous	
‘metaphysical	thinking’	and	references	to	the	human	in	the	singular	were	precisely	the	kind	of	
burden	 that	 sociology	 was	 meant	 to	 leave	 behind;	 ideas	 of	 humanity	 and	 human	 nature	
seemed	 to	 undermine	 sociology’s	 strong	 case	 for	 the	 autonomy	 of	 social	 relations	 as	 a	
legitimate	 field	 of	 enquiry	 (Chernilo	2013,	Manent	1998).	There	 is	no	definitive	 solution	 to	
these	 challenges	 because,	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 a	 universalistic	 principle	 of	 humanity	 is	 a	
condition	 of	 possibility	 of	 sociological	 explanations	 –	 only	 human	beings	 are	 able	 to	 create	
and	 recreate	 society	 in	 all	 times	 and	places	 and	 all	 human	beings	 have	 this	 potential	 –	 the	
status	of	that	shared	humanity	remains	philosophically	and	normatively	problematic.7	
	
Ralf	 Dahrendorf’s	 essays	 on	 Homo	 Sociologicus	 and	 Sociology	 and	 Human	 Nature,	 first	
published	 in	 1957	 and	 1962	 respectively,	 mark	 a	 turning	 point	 in	 our	 reconstruction	
(Dahrendorf	1973).	The	term	philosophical	sociology	does	not	figure	centrally	in	his	texts	but	
he	 explicitly	 focuses	 on	 the	 problem	 of	 human	 nature	 in	 sociology.	 Homo	 sociologicus,	
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contends	Dahrendorf,	is	American	sociology’s	key	contribution	to	the	establishment	of	truly	a	
scientific	 sociology	 –	 similar,	 indeed,	 to	 what	 homo	 oeconomicus	 had	 already	 done	 for	
economics.	Stable	and	predictable	role‐conforming	behaviour	is	sociology’s	representation	of	
that	specific	aspect	of	human	life	that	constitutes	its	particular	subject	matter:	‘[a]t	the	point	
where	 individual	 and	 society	 intersects	 stands	 homo	 sociologicus	 (…)	 To	 a	 sociologist	 the	
individual	 is	his	social	roles’	(Dahrendorf	1973:	6–7).	He	argues	that,	 in	explicitly	unpacking	
homo	sociologicus,	sociology	moves	away	from	metaphysical	reflections	and	fully	separates	its	
descriptive	 and	 normative	 concerns:	 homo	 sociologicus	 is	 explicitly	 not	 a	 full	 account	 of	
human	nature.	Rather,	by	concentrating	only	on	empirically	observable	behaviour,	sociology	
renews	 its	 scientific	vocation	 in	 terms	of	 ‘powerful	explanatory	 theories	of	 social	action’.	 In	
turn,	this	will	allow	sociology	to	leave	behind	the	utopian	project	of	‘describing	the	nature	of	
man	 accurately	 and	 realistically’	 (Dahrendorf	 1973:	 76).	 But	 what	 is	 gained	 in	 scientific	
precision	 and	 predictive	 power	 is	 for	 Dahrendorf	 crucially	 lost	 in	 terms	 of	 normative	
purchase.	The	depiction	of	modern	society	must	 include	such	 issues	as	conformism,	passive	
adaptation	to	mass‐production	and	the	risk	of	totalitarianism,	all	of	which	point	to	problem	of	
modern	alienation	in	ways	that	homo	sociologicus	simply	cannot	grasp:	 ‘[s]ociology	has	paid	
for	 the	 exactness	 of	 its	 propositions	with	 the	 humanity	 of	 its	 intentions,	 and	has	 become	 a	
thoroughly	inhuman,	amoral	science’	(Dahrendorf	1973:	59).	The	difficulty	he	acknowledges	
but	ultimately	cannot	solve	is	that	homo	sociologicus	allows	us	to	explore	conformism	as	a	key	
aspect	of	social	life	only	by	simultaneously	precluding	sociology	from	exploring	human	beings’	
ability	 to	 resist	 and	overcome	 such	 conformism:	 explanatory	 success	 is	paid	 at	 the	price	of	
normative	impotence.		
	
Instead	 of	 defeatism,	 the	 consequence	 I	 should	 like	 to	 draw	 from	 this	 is	 that	 not	 all	
conceptions	of	humanity	or	human	nature	are	equally	fit	for	purpose	for	a	strong	sociological	
programme.	Indeed,	we	observe	at	least	three	main	ways	in	which	conceptions	of	the	human	
have	 actually	 operated	 in	 sociology’s	 history.	 I	 call	 them	 substantive,	 teleological,	 and	
counterfactual.	
	
Substantive.	 A	 first	 group	 of	 ideas	 of	 human	 nature	 to	 be	 found	 in	 sociology	 derive	 rather	
directly	 from	philosophy.	These	are	conceptions	 that	 first	developed	 in	Western	philosophy	
and	 have	 then	 permeated	 modern	 social	 sciences	 (Trigg	 1999).	 I	 cannot	 unpack	 precise	
combinations	between	ideas	of	human	nature	and	conceptualizations	of	social	relations	here,	
but	some	connections	are	readily	available	and	illustrative	my	point:		
	
 Marxism:	an	idea	of	the	material	reproduction	of	human	life	in	which	changes	in	how	
human	labour	is	historically	actualized	lead	to	the	rise	of	different	modes	of	production	
and	changes	in	the	conditions	of	human	exploitation;		
 Psychoanalysis:	 the	 sexual	 drives	 that	 conform	 our	 deep	 personality‐structures	
account	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	moral	 taboos	 and	 institutional	 regulations	 that	 are	
key	components	of	social	life;		
 8
 Utilitarianism:	 On	 the	 basis	 of	 our	 organic	 disposition	 to	 seek	 pleasure	 and	 avoid	
discomfort,	 maximizing	 calculations	 are	 central	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 all	 kinds	 of	
social	arrangements.	
 Theories	of	power:	our	subjectivity	is	the	result	of	struggles	and	forms	of	domination	
to	such	a	large	extent	that	all	forms	of	social	interaction	are	in	effect	conflictive;		
 Theories	 of	 language:	 human	 communication	 is	 the	 fundamental	 attribute	 of	 our	
species,	 so	 social	 institutions	 can	 be	 assessed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 how	 they	 prevent	 or	
promote	freer	forms	of	human	communication.	
	
All	 these	 notions	 of	 human	 nature	 uphold	 some	 kind	 of	 universalistic	 orientation:	 human	
beings	are	all	equally	endowed	with	that	key	attribute	through	which	social	life	is	created	and	
recreated.	More	 problematic	 is	 however	 the	 conflation	 between	 the	 social	 and	 the	 human:	
power,	 labour	 or	 language	 becomes	 both	 the	 key	 attribute	 of	 our	 shared	 humanity	 and	 of	
social	life	itself.	There	is	also	the	risk	that	substantive	ideas	of	human	nature	are	turned	into	
reductionist	accounts	of	social	 life	so	that,	rather	than	an	abstract	principle	of	humanity,	we	
may	end	up	with	monist	accounts	of	human	nature.		
	
Teleological.	 The	 history	 of	 sociological	 thinking	 shows	 the	 recurrence	 of	 evolutionist,	
modernizing,	 historicist	 and	 dialectical	 approaches	 in	 which	 teleology	 play	 a	 major	 role	
(Nisbet	 2009).	 Ideas	 of	 human	 nature	 are	 here	 defined	 less	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 single	 universal	
feature	and	more	in	relation	to	the	historical	unfolding	of	certain	tendencies	that	will	lead	to	
the	full	development	of	our	human	properties	and	to	the	establishment	of	a	progressive	social	
order.	Teleological	arguments	may	have	lost	a	great	deal	of	their	old	appeal,	but	one	of	their	
key	contributions	that	remains	is	how	they	highlight	the	tension	between	the	‘transcendental’	
aspect	 of	 all	 ideas	 of	 history	 –	 how	 history	 presupposes	 some	 sense	 of	 order	 –	 and	 the	
‘immanence’	 or	 contingency	 that	 is	 intrinsic	 to	 socio‐historical	 trends	 and	 events:	 all	
sociological	 conceptions	 of	 historical	 change	 have	 to	 be	 able	 to	 accommodate	 both	 planes	
(Blumenberg	 1983;	 Koselleck	 1989;	 Löwith	 1964).	 The	 reductionist	 universalism	 that	 was	
still	 available	 to	 substantive	 ideas	 of	 human	 nature	 is	 now	 eroded	 further	 because	 whole	
categories	of	human	beings	–	Jews,	Slavs,	slaves,	blacks,	women,	children	–	have	been	placed	
outside	the	human	family	because	they	were	deemed	‘unable’	to	flourish	or	to	‘keep	up’	with	
historical	developments	(Edelstein	2009;	Fine	forthcoming).		
	
Counterfactual.	 A	 third	 possibility,	 and	 the	 one	 favoured	 by	 philosophical	 sociology,	 is	 to	
conceive	the	idea	of	humanity	as	a	major	counterfactual	inside	sociology.	Same	as	regulative	
ideas,	counterfactuals	do	involve	some	substantive	reference,	but	a	key	feature	is	that	rather	
than	being	‘mere	constructs’	counterfactual	ideas	are	‘operatively	effective’	(Habermas	2003:	
107–8).8 Let	me	now	briefly	discuss	two	cases	in	which	a	sociological	principle	of	humanity	is	
in	action.	
	
In	 his	 late	Action	Theory	and	the	Human	Condition,	 Talcott	 Parsons	 reflects	 explicitly	 on	 the	
problem	of	our	shared	humanity.	There,	Parsons	applied	his	well‐known	paradigm	of	the	four	
functions	AGIL,	which	he	had	proved	for	the	conceptualization	of	all	levels	of	reality	(natural,	
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personal,	social	and	cultural),	 to	the	understanding	of	our	fundamental	human	attributes.	In	
other	words,	AGIL	must	now	work	also	from	an	‘anthropocentric	point	of	view’	that	is	able	to	
include	the	generic	point	of	view	of	the	human	species	as	a	whole	as	well	as	‘the	perspective	
of	 the	 concrete	 human	 individual’	 (Parsons	 1978:	 361,	 391).	 This	 principle	 of	 humanity	
explicitly	differentiates	between	social	and	human	aspects,	as	it	focuses	on	those	‘assumptions	
of	social	ordering	at	the	human	level’	(Parsons	1978:	371).	And	in	addition	to	conceptualizing	
the	 connections	 between	 social	 relations	 and	 human	 attributes,	 Parsons’s	 definition	 avoids	
reductionism	 thanks	 to	 the	 multi‐layered	 nature	 of	 AGIL.	 Language	 is	 central	 for	 the	
integrative	function	(I),	and	a	sense	of	‘the	transcendental’,	a	concern	with	the	meaning	of	life,	
is	 central	 for	 the	 latency	 function	 (L).	 But	we	 are	 not	 purely	 ideal	 beings,	 of	 course,	 so	 his	
conceptualization	of	the	human	condition	also	has	an	external	locus:	the	organic	system	of	our	
personality,	which	is	central	for	the	function	of	goal	attainment	(G),	and	the	physico‐chemical	
constitution	with	which	humans	adapt	to	the	natural	environment	(A).	This	multidimensional	
approach	to	the	principle	of	humanity	is	an	insight	that	we	ought	to	retain	because,	on	the	one	
hand,	 it	 unpacks	 the	 universalistic	 presuppositions	 about	 our	 shared	 humanity	 as	 both	
material	 and	 ideal	 beings	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 connects	 without	 eliding	 our	
understandings	 of	 the	 human	 and	 the	 social.	 Indeed,	 the	 telic	 dimension	 explains	 the	
fundamental	 human	 ability	 to	 think	 and	 represent	 ourselves	 by	 imagining	 a	 potentially	
different	state	of	affairs;	 it	grasps	the	specifically	human	skill	of	temporarily	suspending	the	
self‐centred	 standpoint	 that	 characterizes	 all	 forms	 of	 life	 and	 with	 the	 help	 of	 which	 we	
construe	justifications	that	do	not	recourse	to	the	egocentric	point	of	view.			
	
My	 second	 reference	 point	 is	 Margaret	 Archer’s	 explicit	 call	 for	 the	 clarification	 of	
contemporary	sociology’s	principle	of	humanity.	In	her	view,	this	is	firstly	and	fundamentally	
related	 to	 a	 continuous	 sense	of	 the	 self	 that	 is	both	 ‘prior’	 and	 ‘primitive’	 to	our	 ‘sociality’	
(Archer	 1995:	 284).	 A	 second	 feature	 of	 this	 principle	 of	 humanity	 is	 our	 normative	
imagination:	 ‘human	 beings	 have	 the	 unique	 potential	 to	 conceive	 of	 new	 social	 forms’	
(Archer	 1995:	 289).	 And	 there	 is	 also	 a	 third	 one:	 all	 forms	 of	 understanding	 in	 the	 social	
sciences	 require	 that	 ‘they’,	 the	 subjects	 of	 our	 studies,	 and	 ‘we’	 the	 researchers,	 share	key	
human	 attributes	 as	 members	 of	 the	 same	 species.	 However	 tentative,	 and	 regardless	 of	
whatever	may	get	 lost	 in	 the	process,	our	work	as	 social	 scientists	depends	on	how	human	
experiences	 can	 be	 understood,	 shared	 and	 then	 communicated	 to	 others	who	 have	 never	
been	there	–	it	favours	the	transmissibility	of	human	experiences	across	highly	heterogeneous	
historical	and	socio‐cultural	 settings.	This	principle	of	humanity	has	normative	 implications	
built	into	it,	moreover,	because	it	allows	us		
	
to	 judge	whether	 social	 conditions	 are	 dehumanizing	 or	 not.	Without	 this	 reference	
point	 (…)	 then	 justification	 could	 be	 found	 for	 any	 and	 all	 political	 arrangements,	
including	ones	which	place	some	groups	beyond	the	pale	of	‘humanity’.	(Archer	1995:	
288‐9)9	
	
Depending	on	how	we	understand	our	scientific	 tasks	we	may	or	may	not	seek	 to	spell	out	
these	normative	consequences,	but	they	are	integral	to	the	actual	functioning	of	sociology.	As	
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a	regulative	idea,	this	principle	of	humanity	makes	apparent	that	sociological	research	treats	
all	human	beings	as	equally	equipped	for	the	creation	and	recreation	of	social	life	and	this	is	
precisely	 why	 it	 matters	 so	 much	 that	 we	 do	 not	 choose,	 nor	 can	 we	 alter	 at	 will,	 the	
fundamentally	unequal	 and	socially	 created	 settings	within	which	we	 exercise	 these	human	
capabilities.	Sociology	seeks	to	understand	experiences	of	change,	variability	and	conflict	by	
looking	 at	 the	 different	 ways	 in	 which	 social	 life	 is	 and	 has	 been	 organized.	 But	 we	 only	
recognize	 different	 social	 settings	 as	social	because	 we	 are	 able	 to	 trace	 them	 back	 to	 our	
shared	human	belonging:	in	any	of	the	sociological	stories	we	tell,	the	subjects	out	there	could	
well	 have	 been	 us.	 It	 is	 human	rather	 than	 socio‐cultural	empathy	 that	 makes	 sociological	
work	possible.		
	
In	 summary,	 then,	 sociology’s	 principle	 of	 humanity	 upholds	 a	 universalistic	 orientation	 in	
three	planes:	conceptually,	as	all	human	beings	are	equally	able	to	create	and	recreate	social	
life;	 methodologically,	 as	 social	 scientific	 knowledge	 is	 susceptible	 of	 translation	 across	
different	 cultural	 and	 historical	 contexts,	 and;	 normatively,	 as	 it	 offers	 the	 opportunity	 to	
assess	 different	 social	 and	 institutional	 practices	 as	 either	 favouring	 or	 undermining	 the	
development	of	those	fundamental	qualities	that	are	constitutive	of	our	shared	humanity.	The	
principle	of	humanity	is	the	condition	of	possibility	of	sociological	knowledge;	it	is	sociology’s	
own	regulative	idea	(Chernilo	2007b).	
	
III.		
Sociology’s	 principle	 of	 humanity	 makes	 apparent	 the	 tension	 between	 its	 explicit	
commitment	 to	 the	 largely	 constructed	 character	 of	 social	 reality,	 with	 its	 emphasis	 on	
historical	 change,	 socio‐cultural	 variability	 and	 normative	 disagreement,	 and	 the	 mostly	
implicit	requirement	that	the	unity	human	species	is	in	fact	pre‐social.	If	sociology’s	cognitive	
structure	depends	equally	on	the	emergent	status	of	the	social	and	on	a	principle	of	humanity	
that	 is	 independent	 from	 social	 forces,	 then	 this	 clarification	 contributes	 as	 much	 as	
challenges	sociology’s	cognitive	status.		
	
Reinhard	Bendix	has	argued	in	this	connection	that,	as	they	progress	and	become	increasingly	
successful	in	advancing	empirical	knowledge	about	society,	‘[t]he	sciences	of	men	have	grown	
together	 with	 a	 sceptical	 view	 of	 human	 nature,	 and	 the	 latter	 raises	 questions	 about	 the	
utility	of	social	knowledge’	(Bendix	1970:	58).	The	more	insightful	social	scientists	become	in	
understanding	 social	 reality,	 the	 harder	 it	 is	 to	 continue	 believing	 in	 its	 perfectibility;	 the	
more	we	learn	about	how	society	works,	the	more	we	realise	how	difficult	 it	 is	to	change	it.	
Awareness	of	our	own	human	fallibility	undermines	the	collective	trust	in	reason	as	the	key	
human	capacity	that	can	lead	to	social	improvement.	Bendix	then	speaks	of	a	tension	between	
the	explicit	justifications	with	which	the	social	sciences	seek	legitimacy,	the	promise	that	they	
are	 able	 to	 contribute	 to	 social	 betterment,	 and	 a	 major	 undesired	 side‐effect	 of	 social	
research;	 namely,	 the	 fact	 that	 human	 nature	 is	 ultimately	 intractable	 vis‐à‐vis	 social	 life:	
social	 reality	 does	 not	 change	 according	 to	 the	 predictions	 of	 social	 scientists	 and	 human	
nature	hardly	changes	at	all.	Bendix	(1970:	11)	anticipated	the	irrationalist	challenge	that	has	
since	become	mainstream	in	sociology:	the	view	of	human	nature	as	something	that	cannot	be	
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socially	altered	 (at	 least	not	at	will),	 has	been	wrongly	 turned	 into	 reductionist	accounts	of	
social	life,	scientific	knowledge	and	indeed	our	shared	humanity	itself.	We	mistake	the	relative	
independence	 of	 human	 nature	 vis‐à‐vis	 social	 factors	 for	 reductionist	 ideas	 that	 only	
consider	humanity’s	 irrational	 elements	and	we	end	up	with	 conceptions	of	both	 the	 social	
and	 the	human	 that	are	wholly	devoid	of	normative	content.	This	 irrationalism	 is	unable	 to	
account	 for	 its	 own	 position	 and	 leaves	 no	 space	 for	 understanding	 the	 normative	 as	 a	
relevant	aspect	of	social	life	itself.			
	
Contemporary	 sociology	 is	 arguably	 split	 between	 a	 non‐normative	 understanding	 of	 the	
normative	(Abend	2008;	Elder‐Vass	2010;	Turner	2010)	and	militant	positions	that	are	highly	
normative	 in	 orientation	 (Burawoy	 2005).10	 Philosophical	 sociology	 argues	 that	 a	 non‐
normative	understanding	of	the	normative	solves	only	half	of	the	problem	as	it	only	accounts	
for	 its	 socially	 construed	 aspect,	 but	 it	 is	 also	different	 from	militant	 sociology	because	 the	
normative	is	apparent	and	poses	no	intellectual	challenge:	the	former	reduces	the	normative	
to	what	people	think	the	normative	is	and	 the	 latter	anticipates	rather	than	explicitly	pursues	
normative	 self‐clarification.	 Either	way,	 it	 seems	 fair	 to	 say	 that	mainstream	 sociology	 has	
grown	 sceptical	 of	 its	 own	 ability	 to	 think	 the	 normative	 as	 normative.	 Somewhat	
paradoxically,	through	explicitly	anti‐positivistic	arguments,	constructivism,	postmodernism,	
postcolonialism	and	globalism	all	 contribute	 to	one	key	goal	 that	 the	 traditional	positivistic	
agenda	was	never	fully	able	to	accomplish:	a	sense	that	our	disciplines	are	in	fact	ill‐equipped	
to	 conceptualize,	 let	 alone	 advance	 or	 criticize,	 normative	 questions.	 The	 current	 situation	
goes	beyond	 the	wildest	dreams	of	 traditional	positivism,	however,	because	while	 for	 them	
normative	 challenges	 are	 real	 though	 alien	 to	 proper	scientific	research,	 our	 contemporary	
situation	 appears	 to	 be	 an	 ontological	amplification	of	positivism:	 the	 social	 itself	 has	 been	
emptied	of	any	normative	dimension.	We	can	rephrase	this	in	terms	of	the	Weberian	problem	
of	value‐free	social	science.	For	Weber,	our	scientific	commitments	do	not	save	us	from	having	
to	 decide	 what	 we	 ought	 to	 do	 in	 social	 and	 political	 life	 because	 the	 modern	 world	 is	
populated	by	 too	many	value	orientations.	The	contemporary	claim,	on	 the	contrary,	 is	 that	
there	are	no	values	whatever	left	in	the	social	world,	which	is	thus	reduced	to	power	struggles,	
strategic	 bargaining	 and	 identity	 politics.	 Accepting	 the	 difficulty	 of	 making	 normative	
decisions	 and	 then	 calling	 for	 personal	 responsibility	 –	 Weber’s	 dilemma	 –	 is	 altogether	
different	 from	 (let	 alone	 more	 challenging	 than)	 strategically	 seeking	 for	 any	 available	
argument	to	defend	whatever	is	good	for	us.		
	
By	 far	 the	most	 influential	 position	 in	 contemporary	 sociology	 is	 that	 of	 Pierre	Bourdieu.11	
Committed	as	he	is	to	political	causes,	Bourdieu	engages	constantly	with	normative	questions.	
But	normativity	is	not	conceptualized	sociologically,	it	is	not	included	as	an	actual	dimension	
of	the	social	world	because	conflict,	power	and	struggles	give	full	shape	to	his	ontology	of	the	
social:	 ‘[t]he	particularity	of	sociology	is	that	it	takes	as	its	object	fields	of	struggle	–	not	the	
field	of	class	struggle	but	the	field	of	scientific	struggles	itself.	And	the	sociologist	occupies	a	
position	in	these	struggles’	(Bourdieu	1994:	10).	The	normative	motif	of	his	militant	sociology	
is	 that	 the	 interests	 of	 less	 powerful	 actors	 ought	 to	 be	 favoured	 against	 those	 of	 more	
powerful	ones.	The	sociologist	can	be	seen	as	 the	reflexive	amplifier	with	 the	help	of	which	
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subordinate	 actors	 get	 their	 interest	 advanced	wherever	 and	whenever	 this	 is	 needed.	 The	
problem	is	not	at	all	with	Bourdieu’s	political	options	but	with	the	disregard	for	the	need	of	
normative	self‐clarification	 in	social	 life	 (Honneth	1986).	 Indeed,	 in	 terms	of	conceptions	of	
human	nature,	Bourdieu	readily	accepts	that	sociology		
	
inevitably	 appeals	 to	 anthropological	 theories	 (…)	 it	 can	make	 real	progress	 only	 on	
condition	that	it	makes	explicit	these	theories	that	researchers	always	bring	in	(…)	and	
which	are	generally	no	more	 than	 the	 transfigured	projection	of	 their	 relation	 to	 the	
social	world.	(Bourdieu	1994:	19)		
	
As	 we	 explore	 further	 on	 the	 connection	 between	 conceptions	 of	 the	 social	 and	 of	 human	
nature	within	 Bourdieu’s	 sociology,	 all	 we	 obtain	 are	 reductionist	 notions	 of	 interests	 and	
permanent	struggle.	These	then	lead	to	an	irrationalist	conception	of	the	social:		
	
there	is	a	form	of	interest	or	function	that	lies	behind	every	institution	or	practice	(…)	
the	 specifically	 social	 magic	 of	 an	 institution	 can	 constitute	 almost	 anything	 as	 an	
interest	and	as	a	realistic	interest,	i.e.	as	an	investment	(both	in	the	economic	and	the	
psychoanalytic	senses),	that	is	objectively	rewarded,	in	the	more	or	less	long	term,	by	
an	economy.	(Bourdieu	1994:	18)	
	
Let	me	now	come	back	to	the	crises	that	I	mentioned	in	the	opening	paragraphs	to	this	piece.	
Empirically,	 Bourdieu’s	 sociology	 predicts	 that	 there	 will	 always	 be	 winners	 and	 losers	
(remember:	interests	lie	behind	every	institution	and	practice);	normatively,	it	anticipates	on	
which	 side	 our	 loyalties	 should	 be.	 Powerful	 actors	 take	 advantage	 of	 their	 privileged	
positions	 because	 this	 is	 what	 we	 would	 all	 do	 (everyone	 has	 ever	 done?)	 under	 similar	
circumstances.	 If	power‐relations	 change,	others	will	 come	 in	 their	 stead,	do	 similar	 things,	
and	 eventually	 fall	 for	 similar	 vices.	 Bourdieu’s	 sociology	may	 contribute	 to	 the	 structural	
account	 of	 these	 crises	 but	 the	 approach	 remains	 insufficient	 because	 social	 phenomena	
should	not	always	and	necessarily	be	understood	in	terms	of	winners	and	losers.	Furthermore,	
he	 is	 blind	 to	 the	 key	 issues	 of	 what	 is	 normatively	 at	 stake	 and	 what	 role	 do	 normative	
factors	 play	 in	 these	 crises.	 Indeed,	 this	 inability	 goes	 beyond	 Bourdieu’s	 sociology,	 as	
irrationalist	 conceptions	 of	 human	 nature	 that	 centre	 on	 our	 innate	 impulses,	 primordial	
authenticity	 and	 strategic	 bargaining	 are	 equally	 unable	 to	 grasp	 how	normative	 questions	
come	 into	 play	 in	 society.	 This	 ‘normative‐less’	 depiction	 of	 social	 life	 is	 sociology’s	
unintended	contribution	to	our	contemporary	social	malaise;	 it	 is	sociology’s	very	own	self‐
fulfilling	dystopia:	we	do	not	take	normative	factors	into	account	as	part	of	what	we	have	to	
explain	 sociologically	 because	 our	 ontologies	 of	 the	 social	 allow	 for	 no	 concept	 of	 the	
normative.	An	explanation	of	contemporary	crises	must	include	their	normative	aspects,	but	
for	 the	 normative	 to	 emerge	 as	 an	 autonomous	 aspect	 of	 social	 life	 we	 require	 a	 non‐
reductionist	principle	of	humanity.	
	
Let	me	very	briefly	substantiate	further	some	of	these	programmatic	arguments	in	relation	to	
the	emergent	field	of	the	sociology	of	human	rights	(Cushman	2012).	Indeed,	historically,	the	
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sociology	 of	 human	 rights	 still	 needs	 to	 explore	 more	 fully	 its	 connections	 to	 the	
enlightenment	and	the	natural	law	tradition	(Fine	2009).	And	this	is	sociologically	important	
in	terms	of	the	clarification	of	the	conceptions	of	human	dignity	that	underpin	human	rights	
(Habermas	2010)	and	of	the	tensions	between	human	rights	and	popular	sovereignty	as	the	
co‐original	 sources	 of	 modern	 normative	 legitimacy	 (Habermas	 1996).	 We	 surely	 have	 to	
confront	 the	 relativistic	 challenge	 that	 comes	 from	 the	 fact	 that,	 as	 all	 social	 institutions,	
human	 rights	 are	 socially	 constructed	 (Anleu	 1999;	 O’Bryne	 2012).	 And	 there	 is	 also	 the	
problem	of	their	insufficient	practical	purchase	and	only	partial	success	in	terms	of	their	own	
normative	standards	(Morris	2010;	Nash	2009).	The	key	here	is	that	the	criticisms	we	raised	
against	non‐normative	conceptualizations	of	the	social	apply	equally	to	non‐normative	ideas	
of	human	rights;	as	they	cannot	be	justified	on	purely	particularistic	grounds	(Waters	1996),	
their	 universalistic	 justifications	 must	 become	 ever	 more	 sophisticated	 (Donnelly	 2002;	
Young	 2003).	 The	 contribution	 of	 philosophical	 sociology	 may	 lie	 here	 in	 unpacking	 the	
interconnections	 between	 their	 anthropological	 grounding	 in	 a	 principle	 of	 humanity	 that	
remains	pre‐social	and	their	always‐ambivalent	social	and	cultural	actualizations.	In	sociology,	
Bryan	Turner	has	offered	a	principle	of	 this	kind:	our	bodily	constitution	and	human	 frailty	
are	 the	 pre‐social	 and	 universal	 dimensions	 of	 our	 shared	 humanity	 that	 can	 serve	 as	 the	
universalistic	 threshold	 against	which	 to	 assess	 social	 institutions	 and	 thus	 ground	 human	
rights	 (Turner	 1993,	 2006).	 All	 across	 history	 and	 cultures,	 human	 beings	 develop	 a	 sense	
that	certain	practices	and	institutions	cause	human	misery	and,	because	of	that,	ought	to	be	
avoided	 and	 rejected	 (Moore	 1972).	 Human	 rights	 are	 defined	 through	 a	 principle	 of	
humanity	 that	 articulates	 those	 transcendental	 or	 pre‐social	 elements	 as	 they	 become	
actualized	in	various	social	settings;	or,	to	put	it	differently,	an	immanent	idea	of	social	order	
requires	a	meaningful	representation	of	its	own	internal	transcendence:	all	individual	human	
beings	 are	 equally	 endowed	 with	 the	 same	 human	 attributes,	 which	 are	 then	 unequally	
realized	 only	 in	 the	 social	 and	 cultural	 environments	 that	 humans	 create	 by	 their	 living	
together	(Nussbaum	2006).	The	normativity	of	human	rights	can	only	be	justified	in	relation	
to	 a	universal	 but	 is	 lived	 and	 actualized	 in	 the	particulars	 of	 our	 actually	 existing	polities;	
their	 normativity	 is	 immanent	 because	 they	 are	 only	 exercised	 in	 society	 but	 it	 is	 also	
transcendental	in	terms	of	our	innate	ability	to	recognize	others,	and	ourselves,	as	members	
of	 the	 same	 human	 species.	 The	 principle	 of	 humanity	 poses	 cognitive	 limits	 to	 how	 we	
explain	 society	 as	 well	 as	 normative	 limits	 to	 what	 is	 acceptable	 in	 society,	 it	 involves	 a	
tension	between	immanent	 justifications	that	make	arguments	rationally	acceptable	and	the	
transcendental	grounds	that	make	them	binding	(Chernilo	2013).		
	
IV.	
I	 introduced	 the	 idea	of	philosophical	 sociology	as	 an	 invitation	 to	 take	up	 the	 challenge	of	
further	normative	self‐scrutiny	as	a	permanent	component	of	 sociology’s	 scientific	 tasks,	 so	
let	me	conclude	with	three	additional	justifications	for	this	central	claim.	First,	as	said,	what	
turns	 the	workings	 of	 dysfunctional	 institutions	 into	 social	 crises	 is	 not	 only	 their	material	
consequences	but	also	their	normative	deficits.	Understanding	the	eroded	legitimacy	of	these	
institutions	 is	 a	 central	 task	 for	 sociological	 research,	 but	 this	 can	 only	 be	 done	 if	 the	
normative	 is	 explicitly	 conceptualized	 as	normative.	 One	 key	 lesson	 from	 Hannah	 Arendt’s	
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(2006)	chilling	depiction	of	Adolf	Eichmann’s	trial	is	that	there	is	no	radical	ontological	break	
between	 perpetrators	 and	 victims:	 some	 may	 have	 acted	 differently	 under	 similar	
circumstances	but	many	may	not.	Reductionist	conceptions	of	human	nature	make	it	easier	to	
deflect	attention	 from	what	 is	normatively	at	stake:	why	and	how	other	human	beings	acted	
under	particularly	difficult	circumstances.	For	the	normative	to	emerge,	we	need	sociology	to	
observe	what	else,	apart	 from	hedonistic,	 self‐centred	or	 cynical	 considerations	 are	 at	 stake	
for	social	actors:	even	if	universalism	is	not	all	we	need	in	order	to	understand	the	normative,	
the	normative	cannot	be	conceptualized	without	a	universalistic	conception	of	human	beings.	
Secondly,	 normative	 considerations	 become	 sociologically	 visible	 as	 we	 interrogate	 why	
certain	 interests	are	 important	 for	actors	 themselves.	We	must	unpack	what	 is	normatively	
behind	their	options	in	terms	of	their	conceptions	of	the	good,	justice,	democracy	or	freedom.	
Thus,	for	instance,	nationalist	movements	may	justify	their	separatist	claims	on	democratic	as	
well	 as	 on	 xenophobic	 grounds,	 and	 this	 kind	 of	 normative	 clarification	 is	 central	 to	
sociological	 enquiry	 (Chernilo	 2011;	Mann	2005).	Modern	 grammars	 of	 justification	 are	 no	
mere	 rationalizations	of	material	 interests	 and	power	positions:	 they	 are	based	on	 ideas	of	
common	humanity	that	connect	to	socially	differentiated	conceptions	of	justice	(Boltanski	and	
Thévenot	2006).	Things	that	matter	to	people	are	important	to	them	subjectively	because	they	
speak	to	the	shared	potentials	and	limitations	of	all	human	beings	(Sayer	2011).	Thirdly,	we	
human	 beings	 have	 a	 shared	 ability	 to	 represent	 ourselves	within	 the	world	we	 live	 in	 by	
conceiving	new	institutions	and	rules,	by	anticipating	ideal	states	of	affairs	that	we	know	all	
too	well	that	may	never	be	realized.	But	for	us	to	conceptualize	this,	we	still	have	to	question	
the	 culturalist	 and	 constructionist	 taboos	 of	 contemporary	 sociology:	 human	 beings	 have	 a	
transcultural	 and	 transhistorical	 sense	 of	 ‘self‐transcendence’:	 we	 come	 to	 terms	 with	 the	
world	we	live	in	by	imagining	that	a	better	one	is	indeed	possible	(Joas	2000;	Voegelin	2000).	
Social	 life	 unfolds	 as	 human	beings	negotiate	what	we	want,	 can,	 and	must	 do.	A	 tensional	
relationship	between	desires,	opportunities,	and	demands	constitutes	the	plasticity	that	shall	
always	remain	problematic	for	the	social	sciences	because	it	is	a	constitutive	predicament	of	
the	human	condition	as	simultaneously	individual	and	social.		
	
We	do	 indeed	need	to	reflect	on	post‐human	cyborgs,	non‐human	actants,	material	cultures	
and	biopolitical	 transformations,	 and	we	may	 eventually	have	 to	 redefine	our	ontologies	 of	
the	human	and	 the	 social	 accordingly.	But	philosophical	 sociology	offers	 the	 reminder	 that,	
first,	we	still	do	not	fully	understand	what	human	beings	are	vis‐à‐vis	our	conceptualizations	
of	the	social	and,	secondly,	that	all	these	insights	matter	on	the	basis	of	prior	and	systematic	
human	intervention;	we	care	about	them	because	of	their	consequences	on	human	and	social	
life.	 The	 perennial	 tension	 between	 description	 and	 normativity	 in	 sociology	 is	 to	 be	
ultimately	explained	because	we	refer	back	to	human	actions	and	human	consequences,	to	the	
curtailment	or	expansion	of	our	human	lives.	Postmodernism,	globalism	and	postcolonialism	
have	all	contributed	to	the	political	and	epistemological	de‐centring	of	spurious	universalistic	
claims.	 Yet	 as	 their	 arguments	 have	 been	 used	 and	 abused,	 their	 critique	 begins	 to	 look	
exhausted	 and	 inconsequential.	 If	 sociological	 critique	 is	 to	 live	 on,	 we	 need	 to	 reconsider	
rather	abandon	the	question	of	universalism	in	the	social	sciences.	Philosophical	sociology	is	
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an	 invitation	 to	 try	 to	 understand	more	 fully	who	 are	 the	 human	 beings	 that	 populate	 the	
social	world.	
	
Notes	
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2	 The	 German	 tradition	 of	 philosophical	 anthropology	 is	 associated,	 in	 the	 1910s	 and	 1920s,	 with	
works	by	Ernst	Cassirer	and	Max	Scheler	and,	after	World	War	 II,	with	the	names	of	Arnold	Gehlen,	
Helmut	Plessner	and	Helmut	Schelsky.	The	difference	between	both	generations	 is	crucial,	however:	
Cassirer	and	Scheler	are	committed	to	the	universalistic	tradition	of	the	Enlightenment	in	a	way	that	is	
alien	to	the	second	generation.	See	Honneth	and	Joas	(1988),	Heidegren	(1997)	and	Magerski	(2012)	
for	further	discussion.	
	
3	Another	important	source,	which	I	cannot	however	pursue	here,	is	Hans	Jonas’s	(2001:	83,	92)	idea	
of	philosophical	biology:	i.e.,	the	‘reunion’,	through	a	concept	of	freedom,	of	philosophical	anthropology	
and	a	philosophy	of	nature.	The	 importance	of	 Jonas’s	work	 lies	 in	 that	 it	explicitly	accounts	 for	 the	
naturalistic	presuppositions	and	implications	of	this	line	of	enquiry.	
	
4	On	Tönnies’s	vision	of	sociology	as	a	dual	normative	and	descriptive	project,	see	Bond	(2013).		
	
5	See,	similarly,	Harrington	and	Kemple	(2012)	discussion	of	Simmel’s	‘sociological	metaphysics’.	
	
6	A	notable	exception	is	Dennis	Wrong’s	work	(1977:	55–70;	1994:	14–36,	70–109).	
	
7	 The	 recent	 postcolonial	 turn	 has	made	 sociology	 aware	 that	 these	 are	 real	 difficulties	 (Gutiérrez‐
Rodríguez,	 Botaca	 and	 Costa	 2010).	 But	 if	 attached	 to	 the	 rejection	 of	 any	 normative	 value	 to	 a	
universalistic	conception	of	humanity	it	leads	to	self‐defeating	consequences	(Connell	2007).	
	
8	On	regulative	ideas	and	ideals,	see,	paradigmatically,	Kant	(1973:	485–6).	On	how	regulative	ideals	
are	effectively	operative	in	social	scientific	and	normative	enquiry,	see	Emmet	(1994).	
	
9	See	Archer	(2000)	for	further	elaboration	of	these	ideas.	
	
10	Hitlin	and	Vaisey’s	(2010)	collection	surveys	this	field	with	a	view	to	redressing	sociology’s	deficit	in	
conceptualizing	the	normative.		
	
11	As	of	20	January	2014,	Bourdieu	is	the	most	cited	sociologist	in	Google	Scholar	with	a	score	of	over	
319,000	citations.	Marx	and	Weber	come	second	and	third,	respectively,	and	their	citations	combined	
fall	well	short	of	Bourdieu’s	figure.	
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